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Abstract 
Transitional justice has emerged to address victims’ needs as a means of restoring 
relations broken by violence. Yet we know little about victims’ attitudes towards 
different transitional justice mechanisms. Why do some victims prioritize retributive 
justice while others favor other forms of dealing with the violent past? What determines 
victims’ attitudes towards transitional justice policies? To address these questions, we 
offer a new theoretical framework that draws upon recent insights from the field of 
evolutionary psychology and links both war exposure and postwar environments to 
transitional justice preferences. We argue that both past experiences of wartime violence 
and present-day social interdependence with perpetrators impact transitional justice 
preferences, but in divergent ways (resulting in greater support for retributive vs. 
restorative justice measures, respectively). To test our framework, we rely upon a 2013 
representative survey of 1,007 respondents focusing on general population attitudes 
towards transitional justice in Bosnia two decades after the implementation of the Dayton 
Accords. Specifically, we examine the impact of displacement, return to pre-war homes, 
loss of property, loss of a loved one, physical injury, imprisonment and torture on 
attitudes towards transitional justice. On the whole, our findings confirm our two main 
hypotheses: exposure to direct violence and losses is associated with more support for 
retributive justice measures, while greater present-day interdependence with perpetrators 
is associated with more support for restorative justice measures. While acknowledging 
the legacy of wartime violence, we highlight the importance of the post-war context and 
institutional mechanisms that support victims in reconstructing their lives. 
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The war of 1992-1995 left a deep trauma in the Bosnian society as the country was 
subjected to an armed campaign characterized by ethnic cleansing and genocide 
unprecedented for the European continent since WWII (Weller and Wolff 2006:1). Out of 
the pre-war population of 4.37 million, about 110,000 people were killed and 2.2 million 
driven from their homes.
6
 The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) concluded the 
three-and-a-half-years war attempting to strike a balance between the main groups’ 
historical ambitions and preferred institutional options (Belloni 2008). The agreement 
was seen from the very beginning as ‘both a blessing and a curse’ (Weller and Wolff 
2006:1). The violent nature of the war and its devastating human cost have prompted 
peace negotiators at the time to emphasize the military aspects of the conflict aiming to 
end violence (Keil & Kudlenko, 2015: 4). Yet Bosnia and Herzegovina has also made 
great advances in the process of its post-conflict transformation with its infrastructure 
rebuilt and half of its displaced persons supported in their return efforts to their original 
homes (Bieber 2006: 43).  
Two decades on, Bosnia has also emerged as critical for transitional justice and 
reconciliation studies, not only for the variation in conflict experience among victims, but 
                                                        
6
 The most reliable fatality figures on the Bosnian war have been compiled by the 
Research and Documentation Center (RDC) in Sarajevo. In June 2007, the RDC recorded 
97,207 war fatalities and estimated that the count could rise by a maximum of another 
10,000 with ongoing research. The head of the ICTY estimates the number of dead at 
110,000. Bosnia War Dead Figure Announced, BBC NEWS, 21 June 2007, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6228152.stm. The current RDC data indicate that 40.82 
per cent of the causalities were civilians; 83.33 percent of the civilian casualties were 
ethnic Bosniacs [Bosnian Muslims] Research and Documentation Center [RDC], 
Research Results and Data Base Evaluation (2007), available at 
http://www.idc.org.ba/presentation/index.htm. ‘Bosniac’ is the self-selected ethnic 
identifier for the Bosnian Muslim community. UNHCR, Update on Condition for Return 
to Bosnia and Herzegovina 2 (Jan. 2005), available at 
http://www.unhcr.ba/publications/B&HRET0105.pdf. 
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also for policies used by the international community to facilitate truth-seeking, 
punishment of perpetrators, and reconciliation. Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia offer 
an opportunity to reassess theory and practice in transitional justice given the variation of 
victims’ responses. Bosnians have also experienced violence differently across parts of 
the country with some regions facing limited violence and others massive ethnic 
cleansing campaigns and genocide (Toal and Dahlman 2011). Finally, Bosnia is a critical 
case study because of its post-conflict institutional solutions including the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Dayton’s own emphasis on 
property rights for pro-conflict owners which facilitated peaceful voluntary return among 
the internally displaced persons (IDPs) in at least some parts of the country (Bieber 2006; 
Belloni 2008). Taking into consideration this context, this article focuses on post-conflict 
responses to the needs of victims. Despite being central in the study of transitional 
justice, the concept of ‘victimhood’ still remains largely unexplored in the relevant 
literature (Breen-Smyth 2007). In the academic literature and popular media is not 
uncommon to read that ‘victims demand truth’ or ‘justice’, even though several scholars 
have warned against the tendency to treat victims as a uniform group (Sitas et al 2007).  
Our findings point to the variation in approaches to justice among victims. As 
stated and other recent studies beyond Bosnia (e.g. Pham, Weinstein and Longman 2004; 
Samii’s 2011), the picture is much more complicated as different victim groups have 
distinctive conflict experiences and attitudes towards transitional justice polices. To 
address these gaps in the literature we introduce a novel theoretical framework drawing 
on the evolutionary psychology of criminal justice (Petersen et al. 2012, 2010; Robinson, 
Kurzban, and Jones 2007). We argue that direct exposure to violence and traumatic 
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events (i.e. victims) are more likely to support policies of retributive justice. Bolstering a 
culture of victimhood (or ‘ethos of conflict’), victimized communities opt for punitive 
justice. Yet, this is only part of the story. As we show transitional justice preferences are 
not only shaped by retrospective experiences of past violence, but also by the present 
status of the victims, most notably the level of interdependence with perpetrators (e.g. as 
returnees in ethnically mixed communities). By sharing common social networks, victims 
prioritize respect from perpetrators rather than imposing costs on them. In short we 
introduce a novel framework which highlights that transitional justice preferences largely 
depend on victims’ needs, usually shaped by their exposure to violence, such as whether 
they have been displaced, tortured, lost a relative or their loved ones have gone missing 
during the conflict. Most importantly, this article’s findings demonstrate the space for 
post-conflict interventions and their effects in addressing victims’ needs.   
So far, the lion’s share of the literature is devoted exclusively on measuring the 
‘success’ of specific transitional justice mechanisms, or their ‘impact’ on the quality of 
the emerging democracy or the human rights. This is measured against exogenous 
variables; the point of reference for most analyses remains the society (at large), and in 
most cases without accounting for any deviation in transitional justice priorities among 
different victims groups. Although scholars have increasingly attempted to account for 
the variation in the transitional justice preferences of distinct victims groups, few 
quantitative survey studies have focus on this area;
 7
 unlike qualitative studies, surveys 
also face the question of representative sampling, as victims are hard to identify among 
the general population especially in most post-conflict societies.  
                                                        
7
 For exceptions see for instance Gibson 2002; Biro et al 2004; Pham, Weinstein and 
Longman 2004; Nalepa 2007 & Lordos, 2016. 
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Our findings build on previous research suggesting that transitional justice 
preferences are shaped to a significant extent by the exposure to past violence, 
particularly support for policies of retributive justice. This illustrates the long-lasting 
impact of the legacies of violence on societies emerging from violence. Individuals who 
were imprisoned, tortured or had physical injury are more likely to support forms of 
retributive justice, primarily prosecutions of perpetrators. At the same time, those whose 
present status force them to co-exist with former enemies, such as refugees and internally 
displaces who returned to their homes after the end of the war, are most likely to support 
restorative policies such as forgiveness, apologies or even amnesties.  
This article makes a contribution to our understanding of the attitudes of different 
victims (and non-victims) groups towards alternative transitional justice policies. This is 
important not only because it is one of the first efforts to shed analytical light on this 
unexplored relationship, but also because of its potential to improve the architecture of 
transitional justice by designing transitional justice measures tailored to the needs of 
specific victims groups, rather than the society at large. There is a clear policy lesson 
stemming from this paper, namely that the deployment of specific measures of 
reparations at least for some victim categories (e.g. the returnees) could make a positive 
contribution to peace.  
Finally, we contribute to future research by drawing on a 2013 representative 
sample survey of 1,007 respondents in Bosnia, which focuses on attitudes towards 
transitional justice two decades after the Dayton Accords.
8
 The survey’s insights will 
enable specialists to conduct related opinion polls across post-conflict societies in order 
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to assess attitudes towards transitional justice, to identify institutional designs more likely 
to facilitate reconciliation and, most importantly, to examine critical concerns of victims 
that must be addressed to make ‘positive peace’ imaginable  
 
Literature Review 
The study of victimhood and victims groups lies at the heart of transitional justice. The 
very raison d’etre of transitional justice is to restore social relations broken by civil war 
and thereby peacefully reintegrate victims and perpetrators into the society (Breen-Smyth 
2007; Hayner 2010). As such it is hardly surprising that part of the early literature 
focused on the impact of the mobilization of victims groups in landmark cases for 
transitional justice, such as the Mothers of the disappeared during the military junta in 
Argentina (De Brito et al 2001; Sikkink 2008). More recent literature has explored how 
different victims groups have mobilized to push national and international actors for the 
adoption of particular mechanisms; the interdisciplinary study of Nettelfield and Wagner 
sheds light on how the victims in the post-genocide Srebrenica have effectively shaped 
the politics of memory and reparations in Bosnia (2013). More recently, the relatives of 
the disappeared of the Spanish civil war (1936-1939), have mobilized in their quest to 
exhume the remains of those executed by the Francoist forces, marking an unprecedented 
example of post-transitional justice (or delayed justice) (Aguilar 2008; Kovras 2014). 
These studies emphasize the mechanisms through which victims have been a driving 
force in influencing transitional justice outcomes, and therefore have taken center-stage 
in the theoretical debates. 
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 Moreover, the literature of transitional justice has greatly benefited from a more 
recent qualitative turn towards ‘victim-centered’ studies. This in turn is predicated on 
three key objectives: paying closer attention to victims’ voices, understanding their 
needs, while also assessing how effective transitional justice policies are in addressing 
these needs. Stover and Shikegane (2004), as well as Wagner (2008) have shed light on 
one of the starkest illustrations of disjuncture between international criminal proceedings 
and victims’ needs. The exhumations in Srebrenica ordered by the ICTY with exclusive 
mandate to collect incriminatory evidence to secure conviction of perpetrators, originally 
excluded the prospect of identifying individual victims which traumatized and infuriated 
families of the missing. Working on the same context, Nettelfield echoes a similarly 
frictional relationship between criminal prosecutions and victim’s priorities (2010). 
Based on ethnographic research in Nepal, Robins sheds lights on the disjuncture between 
the emotional, social and material needs of the families of missing persons and official 
transitional justice policies in place (2011). Aronson echoes the same flawed relationship 
between the workings of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC 
henceforth) and the needs of the families of the missing to identify the human remains of 
their loved ones (2011). Millar found that both retributive (trials) and restorative (truth 
commissions) models of transitional justice have failed to address victims’ needs in post-
conflict Sierra Leone (2011). Common themes emerging from this branch in the literature 
is that mainstream transitional justice policies often fail to accommodate the needs of 
victims, different victims’ groups have different needs, and they call for a more critical 
and grassroots approach to understand how different victims groups assess their needs 
after conflict (Doak 2011; Gready and Robins 2014). 
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In parallel a critical body of research has attempted to provide a theoretical 
account of how mainstream transitional justice policies have shaped our (theoretical) 
understanding of ‘victimhood’ and ‘victims groups’. McEvoy and McConnachie have 
illustrated the contested nature of the concept of ‘victimhood’ in post-conflict settings; 
more specifically, they maintain that transitional justice policies are often based on an 
unfounded hierarchy of victimhood, one which distinguishes between the more deserving 
and the less deserving (2012; 2013). For example, the mandate of the truth commissions 
often includes the most vocal or visible victims’ groups, while at the same time exclude 
other less politically important groups of survivors. 
So far related qualitative studies have offered extremely useful insights that have 
benefitted our understanding of victims’ needs in post-conflict settings. Quantitative 
studies provide the supplementary evidence that could help trace the key processes that 
lead to specific policy outcomes. In essence, there is only an implicit understanding that 
differing groups have different attitudes towards transitional justice policies. Still by 
definition qualitative studies are not designed to offer statistically representative samples, 
one which would account for variations in transitional justice preferences among 
different groups of victims.  
Quantitative studies have offered some insights, but their primary emphasis is 
placed on measuring the success or impact of particular policies (prosecutions, truth 
commissions, amnesties) on quality of emerging democracy or respect for human rights 
(Kim and Sikkink 2010; Binningsbo et al 2012; Olsen et al 2010; Sikkink and Walling 
2007; Gibson 2006). More recent quantitative studies have used survey experiments to 
explore the impact of policies of lustration (David 2011; Nalepa 2010).  
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Little emphasis has been paid to create a more rigorous conceptual framework 
around victims or systematic understanding of the attitudes of victims groups towards 
transitional justice. More specifically, there is a clear gap in our understanding of whether 
and how different types of exposure to violence (i.e. victimhood) affect post-conflict 
transitional justice preferences. Only a handful of studies have attempted to link 
victimization and justice or reconciliation preferences, with mixed findings. Based on a 
survey administered in post-genocide Rwanda, Pham, Weinstein and Longman (2004) 
found that respondents who were exposed to multiple traumas were most likely to be 
more positive towards the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and less 
open to reconciliation. Samii’s study in Burundi, supports this findings as direct victims 
of violence strongly support retributive policies (i.e. punishment of perpetrators) (2011). 
However, in the Bosnian context, Stover and Weinstein found that there is no direct link 
between exposure to trauma and desire for trials (2004). A number of other studies have 
found a positive correlation between personal victimization and support for policies of 
material reparations (Gibson 2002; Nalepa 2007; Biro et al 2004). David and Choi (2006) 
suggest that ex-prisoners who suffer from continued economic deprivation or health 
problems as a result of their incarceration find it harder to forgive culprits. Victims with 
stronger religious beliefs are more open to forgiveness (ibid). Aguilar et al (2011) 
explored the transitional justice preferences of the general population in Spain, and they 
found that these groups with more recent traumatic experiences had more positive view 
of truth commissions, while ideology plays an important role as the heirs of 
‘republicans’/victims are generally more proactive supporters of transitional justice. In 
one of the most counter-intuitive findings, Nussio et al found no significant divergence 
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between the attitudes victims and non-victims towards transitional justice in Colombia 
(2015). 
Identifying the transitional justice preferences of different groups of victims is a 
central gap that quantitative studies are well suited to address. We also make a novel 
contribution by distinguishing among different victims groups and further exploring 
alternative links between exposure to violence and transitional justice preferences. We 
maintain that for analytical, methodological and disciplinary reasons, this is an important 
gap that needs to be addressed. Analytically, it is important to unpack the generic 
category ‘victims’ into distinct groups and understand their preferences. 
Methodologically, it is vital to overcome the current dialogue of the deaf between the 
literatures of ‘conflict studies’ and ‘transitional justice’; the former exploring exposure to 
violence during conflict while the latter focuses on the period after the official peace 
agreement.
9
 We seek to bridge this gap by highlighting the ways in which conflict-
induced trauma shape transitional justice preferences.  
Finally, social psychology is the discipline that could offer a comprehensive 
framework to connect individual needs with victims’ groups, but also boost our quest to 
theorize on the political, emotional and societal determinants of victims towards justice 
(Muldoon 2013; Canetti et al 2013; Skitka 1999). Yet, so far it has peripheral role in 
transitional justice debates, currently dominated by political scientists and lawyers. To 
this end we contribute to the literature by introducing a new theoretical framework 
drawing on evolutionary psychology of criminal justice to shed light on the transitional 
justice preferences. Most significantly, while most legal or political perspectives present 
                                                        
9
 With few important exceptions (Weinstein et al 2004) 
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attitudes to transitional justice as binary (truth v. justice), this framework provides a more 
dynamic picture one that explores their relationship. As ullustrated below, we argue that 
this framework is analytically more intelligible precisely because it avoids the simplistic 
representation of ‘victims’ as a generic group. Essentially, by deploying this approach we 
can both measure individual attitudes towards transitional justice while simultaneously 
explore the construction of shared sets of beliefs among those exposed to specific forms 
of traumatic experiences; what Daniel Bar-Tal calls the ‘Ethos of Conflict’ (Bar-Tal 
2007). Most importantly, it is a more comprehensive analytical framework which paved 
the way to other researchers, including legal scholars and historians, to trace the 
relationship between these different types of exposure to traumatic events and major 
transitional justice outcomes (i.e. the development of legal norms and the construction of 
shared beliefs by specific victim groups). 
 
Transitional Justice: An Evolutionary Social Psychological Framework 
This section explains how attitudes towards transitional justice in postwar societies are 
shaped by 1) past experiences of wartime violence and 2) present-day social 
interdependence with perpetrators. We argue that while exposure to heinous war crimes 
increases support for retributive justice (stemming from the wartime logic of deterrence), 
interdependence with perpetrators increases victims’ support for restorative justice (in 
response to their shared fate). Below we provide an overview of the social psychology of 
intergroup conflict and recent advances in the evolutionary psychology of criminal 
justice. Bringing together these two literatures, we offer a new evolutionary social 
psychological perspective on victims’ transitional justice preferences in postwar settings.  
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The Social Psychology of Intergroup Conflict  
 
The organization of the self and others in terms of group memberships is a universal 
process driven by the fundamental survival strategy of group living (Brewer 1999). In-
groups define communities of mutual trust, obligation, interdependence and cooperation, 
but they also delimit out-groups. In-group belonging entails conforming to the in-group 
image as well as accentuating intergroup differences. Social categorization thus satisfies 
the opposing yet basic human needs for assimilation with, and differentiation from, others 
(Brewer 1991). In-group favoritism is pervasive and not limited to conflict situations 
(Tajfel and Turner 1986). However, under threatening wartime conditions in-group biases 
are transformed into more salient and durable forms of out-group discrimination, 
derogation and intolerance (Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis 2002, 579). The spiral of 
collective violence that unfolds in wartime settings is underpinned by the logic of 
deterrence and counter-aggression in response to exploitation by outsiders.  
The set of interrelated shared beliefs that emerges from this process is termed the 
“ethos of conflict” or “conflict ideology” (Canetti et al. 2015, Bar-Tal et al. 2012). These 
beliefs are essentially a set of collective coping resources deployed by groups in part to 
help meet the basic psychological needs of their members (Bar-Tal and Halperin 2011). 
Here we highlight three examples of such basic needs: reducing uncertainty about how 
one should behave in the midst of a chaotic and threatening environment; reinforcing a 
positive self-image in response to outgroup exploitation; and reducing anxieties about 
death that inevitably arise in the context of war.  
On a fundamental level, periods of violent social conflict disrupt the basic 
schemas and plausibility structures that individuals rely upon to make sense of the world 
around them and to feel safe within that predictable world (Berger and Luckman 1966, 
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121, Janoff-Bulman 1992). Shared beliefs about conflict offer a simplified, dichotomized 
and one-sided view of the conflict that renders the social world and one’s place within it 
intelligible again (Hogg 2000). Casting the in-group as the victim and out-groups as 
aggressors thus reduces uncertainty and stress for ingroup members, but also results in 
biased information processing (Porat, Halperin, and Bar-Tal 2015).  
Second, conflictive beliefs help reinforce self-esteem when it is threatened by 
conflict. Group memberships, and the value and emotional significance attached to them, 
form part of the self-concept (Tajfel 1981, 255). Threats to the in-group during conflict 
thus threaten self-esteem, while in-group favoritism and out-group derogation reinforce 
self-esteem. This leads ingroups members to contrast their positive self-image with the 
evil nature of outgroups.  
Third, war also raises the possibility of one’s own death, frustrating on a 
psychological level the basic human need for self-preservation (Becker 1973). However, 
fear of death may be reduced, and psychological equanimity restored, by investing in and 
maintaining psychological structures like the ethos of conflict that restore a sense of 
meaning, order and permanence to life (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and Solomon 1986).  
In sum, the social psychology of warfare involves a powerfully pervasive set of 
shared beliefs that support conflict. Over time, this ethos contributes to the formation and 
maintenance of social identities, increasing the intractability of intergroup conflict (Bar-
Tal 2007). The beliefs that originally developed in response to the conditions of war thus 
become entrenched and tend to endure into postwar environments. In the next section, we 
examine how the psychology of intergroup conflict fuels human intuitions about 
transitional justice in postwar settings. We also offer an opposing account of the effects 
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of interdependence between victims and perpetrators based on new findings in the field 
of evolutionary psychology. 
 
The Evolutionary Psychology of Criminal Justice  
Recent findings from the field of evolutionary psychology suggest that selection 
pressures at work in our pre-agricultural, hunter-gatherer human ancestry provide us with 
an evolved psychology that continues to shape our present-day intuitions about criminal 
justice (Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones 2007, Petersen et al. 2012, 2010). The ancestral 
social life of Sapiens, like other species, involved individuals willing to exploit others for 
their own benefit (Duntley 2005). As a result, psychological mechanisms were selected 
for in order to counter exploitation of the self, family, and band. Features of modern 
crimes continue to satisfy the input conditions of these evolved mechanisms, resulting in 
a lasting legacy of criminal justice preferences. 
According to Petersen et al.’s ‘recalibrational theory of counterexploitation’, 
when confronted with exploitation the human mind spontaneously calculates levels of 
two separate psychological variables (Petersen et al. 2010). The first represents the 
seriousness of the crime, while the second represents the perpetrators ‘association value’ 
for the victim; that is, their level of interdependence with the exploited person and their 
value as a potential associate in future social relations. While the seriousness of the crime 
regulates how much to react (how severely to punish the perpetrator), the perpetrators 
association value regulates the more fundamental decision of how to react (whether to 
punish or repair broken relations) (Petersen et al. 2012). 
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Based on the input from these two variables, humans deploy two basic counter-
exploitation strategies (Petersen et al. 2010, 2012). The first is the strategy of punishment 
(retributive justice), which follows the tit-for-tat logic of deterrence. Punishment deters 
future exploitation by imposing costs on perpetrators appropriate to their crimes. This 
strategy runs the risk of further distancing the victim from the perpetrator and their social 
networks. However, the risk of social distancing is justified if the social networks of the 
victim and perpetrator share little overlap (perpetrators are perceived as outsiders and 
thus the costs imposed on them will not indirectly harm the victim). 
A key source of information regarding the seriousness of war crimes is the 
personal experience of victims. Past experience of heinous crimes and irrecoverable 
losses should result in greater support for retributive justice measures that follow the 
wartime logic of deterrence (e.g. fair trials resulting in harsh punishments) and less 
support for restorative justice measures (e.g the forgiveness of perpetrators that have 
recanted their crimes and amnesties). These considerations result in the following 
hypotheses: 
 
H1. Exposure to more serious crimes (physical injury, the irrecoverable loss of a loved 
one, imprisonment or torture as opposed to loss of property) is associated with 
greater support for retributive justice measures delivering harsh punishments (fair 
trials resulting in harsh punishments as opposed to financial compensation). 
 
H2. Exposure to more serious crimes (physical injury, the irrecoverable loss of a loved 
one, imprisonment or torture) is associated with less support for restorative justice 
measures that avoid such punishments (the forgiveness of perpetrators that have 
recanted their crimes and amnesties) 
 
The second human counter-exploitation strategy is restoration (restorative justice), which 
aims to reduce the risk of future exploitation by increasing the extent to which the 
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perpetrator values the victim rather than imposing costs on them. The focus of restorative 
justice is on communicating to the perpetrator the true associational value of the victim 
encouraging them to understand the harm they have caused to others. This strategy is 
justified if imposing costs on the perpetrator would indirectly harm the victim through 
their membership in shared networks (they are in fact interdependent). The viability of 
this strategy depends upon the extent to which the perpetrator is willing to increase the 
value they place on the victim’s welfare (e.g. is not considered as having an essentially 
evil or aggressive nature). The exploited person is more likely to perceive this to be the 
case if their associational value is higher (signaling that the perpetrator is harming 
themselves indirectly through their crimes by imposing costs on interdependent 
associates). Cues such as feelings of remorse and sincere apologies signal that the 
perpetrator recognizes the harm they have inflicted and intends to confer benefits on the 
victim (or their family or social networks) rather than continue to exploit them in the 
future.  
 During the Bosnian War, the areas most targeted by violence were those in which 
ethnic dominance was uncertain. Ethnic cleansing in these areas resulted in people 
largely fleeing to areas in which their own ethnic community formed the majority (or 
abroad to e.g. Austria, Germany and Sweden). The vast majority of the IDPs and refugees 
that return to their pre-war homes are moving from ethnic majority areas or from abroad 
to more mixed areas that were simultaneously the sites of the lion’s share of war crimes. 
This places them in greater proximity to and interdependence with perpetrators. From this 
discussion we derive the following hypotheses: 
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H3. Return to pre-war homes is associated with greater support for restorative justice 
measures such as the forgiveness of perpetrators that have recanted their crimes and 
amnesties 
 
H4. Return to pre-war homes is associated with less support for retributive justice 
measures that impose costs on perpetrators (fair trials resulting in harsh 
punishments as well as financial compensation) 
 
Survey Data and Methods 
We examine the impact of wartime experiences and war-related losses on attitudes 
towards transitional justice. Using regression analysis, we relate respondents’ attitudes to 
six different measures aimed at capturing war experiences and losses: displacement status 
(never displaced, still displaced, and return to pre-war homes), loss of property, loss of a 
loved one, physical injury, imprisonment and torture. Attitudes related to transitional 
justice are captured by seven different indicators aimed at providing a comprehensive 
perspective on respondents’ preferences for retributive as opposed to restorative justice. 
These include the extent to which individuals support amnesty for war criminals if that 
would help to ensure a lasting peace, support for forgiveness of perpetrators, the desire 
for war criminals to be harshly punished if found guilty by a fair trial, support for 
criminals paying compensation to their victims, support for the state paying 
compensation to victims, support for a formal state apology for past atrocities, and the 
extent to which individuals believe that it is necessary to right the injustices of the past in 
order to ensure a lasting peace. In each regression, we control for a rich set of individual 
background characteristics. These include education, ethnicity, economic situation prior 
to war, residency status (urban or rural), age and gender. 
The data used in our analysis were collected in a survey we conducted in Bosnia 
in June and July 2013. The data collection was done by Sarajevo-based Ipsos BH. We 
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used multi-stage sampling and included data across different victim categories. IPSOS 
conducted the survey using a four stage stratified sample. In the first stage, it selected 
municipalities using simple random sampling,
10
  in the second stage it selected a polling 
station proportional to its size within selected municipalities, in the third stage it selected 
household using random route technique selection from a given address, and finally in the 
fourth stage, it selected individuals within the household to be interviewed using a Kish 
table. If respondents consented to be interviewed, the field interviewers conducted face-
to-face interviews in the homes of the participants. The senior staff of the survey agency 
conducted the day-to-day monitoring of the data collection process and provided daily 
updates to the PI. The response rate was 63.53%, with a total of 1,007 interviews 
completed. After data collection, the results were entered into an SPSS file, and original 
copies of the questionnaires were destroyed. IPSOS survey statistician calculated weights 
on the basis of inclusion probabilities and demographic data available. The analysis was 
conducted using the statistical software package Stata 13. 
 
Displacement and Return to Pre-War Homes 
 
As discussed in the theoretical section, while present-day interdependence with 
                                                        
10
 The sampling frame was stratified on the basis of two stratification  variables. First 
stratification variable was based on Bosnia’s two entities: Federation and Republika 
Srpska.  Second stratification variable was based on the coefficient of return (CR) for 
each municipality. The CR combined the 1991 pre-war Census data with the 2005 
estimates of return (provided by the Bosnian Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees 
(Nenadic et al: 2005)) to express the estimated per cent of the pre-war minority 
population which returned to the given municipality in the post-war period. The median 
value of the CR for the Federation was 12.49% and the median value for the RS was 
14.74%. In the Federation we randomly selected 12 municipalities where the CR was less 
than median and 11 municipalities where the CR was greater than the median. Similarly, 
in Republika Srpska we randomly selected 7 municipalities where the CR is less than the 
median and 5 municipalities where CR is greater than the median.)  
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perpetrators should result in increased support for restorative justice, greater past 
exposure to war violence and war-related losses should be associated with greater support 
for retributive justice. We rely upon return to pre-war homes as a proxy for greater 
interdependence with perpetrators. Indeed, 60 percent of the displaced persons that were 
wounded, imprisoned, tortured or lost a loved one affirmed that they personally knew at 
least some of the perpetrators that had mistreated them (N=115). This statistic does not 
account for the many additional associational linkages between victims and perpetrators 
that this implies. By definition, return to pre-war homes puts victims into closer social 
proximity to perpetrators and the social networks to which they belong.  
Specifically, we compare those that remain displaced from their pre-war homes to 
those that were never displaced and those that returned to their pre-war homes. We 
hypothesize that, in comparison to those that remain displaced or were never displaced, 
returnees would express greater support for restorative justice since perpetrators would 
have greater ‘association value’ for returnees as they negotiate their daily existence 
(Petersen et al. 2012, 2010).  
The findings indicate that compared to those that remain displaced, returnees are 
more likely to embrace amnesty (no punishment) for perpetrators whom they must, 
presumably, live beside (see Table 1). In addition, they are less likely to wish for 
perpetrators to be harshly punished if found guilty by a fair trial (supporting Hypothesis 
4). Instead, they express more support for the view that perpetrators should be forgiven 
(supporting Hypothesis 3). These findings offer strong support for our theoretical 
framework. Interdependence with perpetrators appears to down-regulate the willingness 
of victims to impose costs on perpetrators and upregulate their propensity towards 
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forgiveness. Imposing costs on others with high association values indirectly harms the 
victim and precludes downstream fitness benefits derived from perpetrators and their 
associates. By contrast, forgiveness is the result of an evolved system designed to signal a 
restoration of valuable social relationships following exploitation (McCullough, Kurzban, 
and Tabak 2013, Burnette et al. 2012). 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Compared to those that remain displaced, those never displaced are more likely to accept 
amnesty for war criminals if that ensured a lasting peace and are more likely to want the 
state to apologize for past atrocities (see Table 1). Thus in comparison to those still 
displaced, those that were never displaced are more in favor of blanket amnesty for 
perpetrators. This is in line with our model as well; perpetrators have low association 
value for those that were displaced but never returned to their pre-war homes (supporting 
Hypothesis 4). At the same time, these individuals have a more intimate experience of 
war violence and war losses compared to those that were never displaced, resulting in 
less support for amnesties (supporting Hypothesis 2). It is perhaps for this reason that 
those that were never displaced are more interested in abstract and symbolic reparative 
strategies such as state apologies aimed at collective acknowledgement of past 
wrongdoings. 
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Despite these differences between displaced persons that never returned and those 
never displaced in the first place, both groups express stronger preferences for retributive 
justice measures in comparison to returnees (supporting Hypotheses 4).
11
  
Overall, these findings support our proposition that the local post-war context in 
which people find themselves has an important influence on transitional justice 
preferences. In the case of displaced persons, return to pre-war homes results in greater 
preference for restorative justice. 
 
Social Capital and Community Organizations 
In addition to affecting the level of interdependence with perpetrators, an additional 
feature of one’s local environment that may shape transitional justice preferences is 
involvement in social organizations such as displaced persons’ associations. The survey 
item capturing participation in displaced persons’ organizations during the last 12 months 
suffers from a lot of non-response (not reported in Table 1). However, based on the 
responses we have, those that participated at least once in such organizations express 
more support for amnesty (b= 0.793, p=0.041), a state apology (b=0.527, p=0.070) and 
the view that past injustices must be addressed in order to resolve conflicts (b=0.184, 
p=0.055). This mixed result appears somewhat confusing at first glance. However, and in 
                                                        
11
 It is also interesting to compare returnees to those never displaced (not shown in table). 
Compared to those never displaced, returnees express more support for amnesty  
(b=0.482, p=0.010), less support for criminal prosecutions (b=-0.268, p=0.007), more 
support for perpetrators paying compensation to victims (b=0.317, p=0.004), more 
support for the state paying compensation to victims (b=0.258, p=0.011), and less support 
for a state apology (b=-0.242, p=0.054). Returnees thus tend to have stronger preferences 
for restorative justice, including financial compensation, compared to those never 
displaced from their homes, although they are less supportive of symbolic gestures made 
by the state.  
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line with our theoretical framework, the first two results (amnesty and a state apology) 
appear to be driven purely by displacement status. Returnees are more likely to 
participate than those still displaced; controlling for displacement status renders the effect 
of participation insignificant. After controlling for displacement status, however, those 
who participate in displaced persons’ associations still express more interest in righting 
past injustices. This finding remains an anomaly, although the data is rather weak. 
Interestingly, those that were members in displaced persons’ associations during 
their forced expulsions also express more support for the payment of compensation to 
victims’ option from both war criminals (b=0.476, p=0.000) and the state (b=0.382, 
p=0.006). This may be because membership in associations increased their willingness to 
seek redress in spite of the potential drawbacks of imposing costs on perpetrators (this 
conjecture does not include the state, however, which is not a human ‘associate’), but it 
may also be the result of those most willing to seek compensation joining associations in 
order to work collectively towards their goals. The results are compatible with either 
interpretation.  
In sum, although more research will be required in order to fully examine this 
hypothesis, particularly in other cases such as Cyprus or Georgia where return has not 
been an option yet, the findings regarding membership and participation in organizations 
suggest that social capital may contribute to shaping transitional justice preferences 
among those displaced during the war. This leaves open the possibility that social 
organizations may override victims’ sense of interdependence with perpetrators and 
increase support for imposing financial costs on perpetrators in order to right past 
injustices. 
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On the whole, however, the findings largely support our conjecture that present-
day interdependence with perpetrators results in increased support for restorative justice 
measures. 
 
Direct Exposure to Violence and War-Related Losses 
In the theoretical section we drew a distinction between current and past experiences in 
shaping individuals’ transitional justice preferences. It is important to understand that not 
all displaced persons were exposed to the same set of past experiences or losses during 
the war. Thus within any particular situation (e.g., return to pre-war residences versus 
remaining in the areas to which one was displaced during the war), individuals’ 
transitional justice preferences will differ due to variation in their personal experiences 
during the war. We hypothesized that the experience of more extreme forms of war 
violence and war-related losses would result in greater support for retributive justice 
measures following tit-for-tat logic of deterrence.  
The findings indicate that when it comes to the transitional justice preferences of 
those displaced during the war (both those that remain displaced and those that returned 
to their pre-war homes), individuals directly exposed to war violence and war-related 
losses tend to express greater preferences for the retributive justice over restorative 
justice (supporting Hypothesis 1-2). This is in line with previous literature, which 
suggests that exposure to violence and losses results in greater adherence to the ‘ethos of 
conflict’: a situation that may persist long after wars end. However, there are several 
nuances with regard to previous experience of displaced persons in the context of 
transitional justice that we are able to explore with our unique data.  
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In societies affected by protracted conflict, individuals directly exposed to 
violence and losses tend to adhere more strongly to the conflict-supporting shared beliefs 
of the society – also termed the ‘ethos of conflict’ or ‘conflict ideology’ (Canetti et al. 
2015, Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim, and Johnson 2006, Lavi et al. 2014). As illustrated in 
previous research, exposure to violence and war-losses that cannot be recovered (i.e., the 
loss of loved ones) exert a negative impact on intergroup attitudes in wartime and post-
war situations (Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009, Dyrstad 2012, Besser and Neria 2009, Hayes 
and McAllister 2001, Punamaki, Qouta, and El Sarraj 1997, Pham, Weinstein, and 
Longman 2004, Bakke, O'Loughlin, and Ward 2009, Samii 2011, Dyrstad et al. 2011, 
Gould and Klor 2010, Halperin et al. 2009, Lavi et al. 2014). We contribute to this 
literature in novel ways by examining how exposure to violence and war-related losses 
impact individuals’ transitional justice preferences, which are closely linked to the ‘ethos 
of conflict’ that tends to persist long after wars end (Bar-Tal and Halperin 2011, Bar-Tal 
et al. 2012). In addition, we go beyond existing research by providing a more nuanced 
understanding of the impact of exposure to violence by employing multiple indicators of 
exposure and loss.  
In the theoretical section, we argued that the severity of the crime regulates how 
much to react (how severely to punish the perpetrator). In terms of the severity of crimes, 
we make a distinction between war-related losses that can be recovered (e.g., physical 
property and financial losses) and those that cannot be recovered (e.g., the loss of a loved 
one). Our theoretical expectation is that losses that cannot be recovered will drive 
individuals to pursue retributive justice, while losses that can be recovered will motivate 
efforts to seek financial compensation. The findings demonstrate that those who lost their 
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property during the war (house, apartment or land) want perpetrators to pay 
compensation to their victims (see Table 1). On the other hand, those that suffered 
irrecoverable losses as a result of the war (i.e., lost a loved one) do not want amnesty for 
perpetrators and instead wish them to be harshly punished if found guilty by a fair trial 
(supporting Hypotheses 1-2). The data thus support our theoretical conjecture that the 
type of loss (recoverable or non-recoverable) individuals experience affects their 
transitional justice preferences following a tit-for-tat logic of deterrence. Our findings 
with regard to irrecoverable losses are also in line with previous research in Burundi, 
which showed that loss of an immediate family member resulted in less willingness to 
forgive perpetrators (Samii 2011).  
Turning to direct exposure to violence, the findings suggest that those imprisoned 
express more support for the view that perpetrators should be harshly punished if found 
guilty by a fair trial (supporting Hypothesis 1). Those exposed to physical injury also 
wish perpetrators to be harshly punished if found guilty by a fair trial (supporting 
Hypothesis 1), however they also express less support for amnesty or forgiveness for 
perpetrators (supporting Hypothesis 2). This finding is especially interesting when 
contrasted with the findings presented earlier regarding the effects of return to pre-war 
homes where individuals must live in closer proximity to members of other groups and 
those that perpetrated violence against them or members of their community during the 
war (in comparison to those that remain displaced or were never displaced, returnees 
express more support for forgiveness of perpetrators). These findings are both in line with 
our view that both present experiences (living in pre-war homes versus remaining 
displaced) and previous experiences (personal exposure to violence and losses during the 
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war) shape transitional justice preferences. This finding also helps to explain the puzzling 
findings of previous research: In the North Caucasus of Russia, personal exposure to 
violence was associated with less willingness to forgive perpetrators, but living closer to 
the actual fighting was associated with more forgiveness (Bakke et al. 2009).  
Those exposed to torture also express more support for the view that perpetrators 
should be harshly punished if found guilty by a fair trial (supporting Hypothesis 1). In 
addition, these respondents also tend to feel that it is necessary to right the injustices that 
happened in the past in order to resolve conflicts. They also express less interest in the 
state apologizing for past atrocities and in either the state or perpetrators paying financial 
compensation to victims. Thus, like those imprisoned or physically injured, those tortured 
during the war express greater preferences for retributive justice in general (harsh 
punishments for perpetrators if found guilty by a fair trial and the belief that to create a 
lasting peace it is necessary to right past injustices). At the same time, however, it is 
interesting to note that those exposed to torture also express more support for amnesty for 
perpetrators if that would lead to lasting peace (not in line with Hypothesis 2). This seems 
to suggest that the experience of torture encourages individuals to prioritize preventing 
the recurrence of war by any means necessary, including non-retributive transitional 
justice measures such as amnesty for war criminals. This surprising finding merits further 
investigation in future research.  
On the whole, however, these findings suggest that exposure to violence is 
associated with stronger preferences for retributive justice, and the more extensive the 
exposure, the more extensive the impact on one’s preferences, with the caveat that those 
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tortured during the war also would accept amnesty if that would help to ensure lasting 
peace.  
When it comes to the controls (see Table A1-A6 in the appendix), the results are 
somewhat mixed across all the models. However, we wish to highlight a few findings. It 
is clear that a better economic situation prior to the war is associated with less support for 
financial compensation by both perpetrators and the state. More educated persons express 
less support for amnesties and forgiveness and the view that it is important to right past 
injustices in order to move on after conflict. They also express more interest in criminals 
paying financial compensation to victims. In addition, Bosniaks and Croats express more 
interest in a state apology in comparison to Serbs, presumably since the state in question 
is believed by respondents to mean Serbia.  
 
Conclusion: Return Influences Reconciliation Attitudes among Victims  
Transitional justice has emerged in an effort to address victims’ needs by means of 
restoring social, ethnic and community relations fractured by mass violence. Closer 
attention to civilians in peace processes and/or democratic transitions has been 
necessitated by the changing perception of that civilian victimization is increasing. As we 
demonstrate in this article over the past decades greater attention is placed on civilian 
victimization as opposed to the past, largely due to the emergence of new transnational 
actors who scrutinize and document patterns of crimes coupled with the development of a 
robust international normative framework (Méndez and Wentworth 2011). This changing 
reality (or perception) marks an attempt in the academic and policy literature to move 
from ‘negative’ to ‘positive’ forms of peace-building (Galtung 2001). The emergence of 
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transitional justice as a distinctive field of inquiry reflects precisely this growing 
emphasis in addressing victims’ needs in post-conflict settings.  
 This article contributes to the current debates on positive peace in at least three 
distinctive ways. First, by identifying a set of questions in quantitative survey analysis of 
relevance to vulnerable groups and victims (please see questionnaire attached in appendix 
A). Second, by highlighting the alternative impact different forms of victimization could 
have on attitudes towards transitional justice. And thirdly, by demonstrating that specific 
forms of reparations at least for some victim categories (e.g. the returnees) could make a 
positive contribution to peace. Overall, the survey’s insights will enable specialists to 
conduct related opinion polls across post-conflict societies in order to assess attitudes 
towards transitional justice, to identify institutional designs more likely to facilitate 
reconciliation and, most importantly, to examine critical concerns of victims that must be 
addressed to make ‘positive peace’ imaginable. 
More specifically, in Bosnia our survey of 1007 returnees and non-returnees has 
investigated various victim groups focusing on pre and post-conflict variables explaining 
attitudes towards alternative transitional justice mechanisms following the 1992-1995 
war. We demonstrate that the local post-war context in which people find themselves 
influences transitional justice preferences. Taking into consideration the multiplicity of 
victimhood and transitional justice mechanisms in Bosnia, the article also demonstrates 
that these findings are relevant for transitional justice and conflict resolution studies more 
broadly.  Specifically, we hypothesize that different victim or non-victim groups might 
opt for distinctive transitional justice mechanisms (e.g. state compensation, apologies, 
amnesties, punishment for perpetrators). Our findings suggest that compared to those that 
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remain displaced, those never displaced are more likely to accept amnesty for war 
criminals if that ensured a lasting peace and would like the state to apologize for past 
atrocities. Returnees are also more likely to embrace amnesty but are also more likely 
that those who remain displaced to embrace the forgiveness of perpetrators whom they 
must, presumably, live beside. In addition, they are less likely to wish for perpetrators to 
be harshly punished if found guilty by a fair trial. Instead, they would want them to pay 
compensations to their victims.  
Moreover, those directly exposed to physical violence are less likely to endorse 
amnesty or forgiveness for perpetrators and instead wish them to be harshly punished if 
found guilty by a fair trial. Those who lost loved ones as a result of the war feel similarly. 
In addition, these respondents also express more support for the view that it is necessary 
to right the injustices that happened in the past in order to resolve conflicts. They are also 
less interested in the state apologizing for past atrocities or compensating victims. 
Moreover, the findings suggest that those imprisoned express more support for the view 
that perpetrators should be harshly punished if found guilty by a fair trial. Those exposed 
to physical injury also wish perpetrators to be harshly punished if found guilty by a fair 
trial, however they also express less support for amnesty or forgiveness for perpetrators. 
While those exposed to torture also express more support for the view that perpetrators 
should be harshly punished, if found guilty by a fair trial, our data suggest that the same 
category of victims also express more support for amnesty for perpetrators if that would 
lead to lasting peace. This finding suggests that experience of war could be further 
disaggregated in future surveys as certain experiences might encourage individuals to 
prioritize lasting peace by any means necessary. Admittedly, our survey did not include 
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data on other victim categories (e.g. victims of rape) due to ethical concerns; such crimes 
tied to the conflict experience of certain population groups, in this case women, might 
also lead to different attitudes towards transitional justice.  
Moreover, those who lost their property during the war (house, apartment or land) 
express less support for forgiveness for perpetrators and instead want them to pay 
compensation to their victims. They are also less interested in a state apology. 
Interestingly, the findings demonstrate the interplay between return to pre-conflict homes 
and reduced support for retributive justice (e.g. support for amnesty as opposed to trials 
and forgiveness for perpetrators). Our findings thus demonstrate the critical importance 
of sustainable voluntary returns as a policy priority following civil wars.   
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